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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we interpret three provisions of the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-
1692p.  Elaine and William Levins allege that Healthcare 
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Revenue Recovery Group LLC (“HRRG”) violated 
§§ 1692e(14), 1692d(6), and 1692e(10) by leaving telephone 
voice messages that did not use its true name, did not 
meaningfully disclose its identity, and used false 
representations and deceptive means to collect or attempt to 
collect a debt or obtain information about a consumer.  In 
particular, the Levinses complain that voicemail messages in 
which HRRG went by the name of “ARS” were insufficient to 
identify it as HRRG or even as “ARS ACCOUNT 
RESOLUTION SERVICES,” which is an alternative business 
name used by HRRG.  HRRG moved to dismiss the complaint, 
as amended, for failure to state a claim, and the District Court 
granted that motion. 
 
We conclude that the Levinses have stated a plausible 
claim that HRRG violated § 1692e(14)’s “true name” 
provision, but they have not stated plausible claims under 
§§ 1692d(6) or 1692e(10).  Accordingly, we will vacate in part 
and affirm in part the dismissal of their case. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Allegations In The Complaint1 
 
The Levinses, who live in New Jersey, purportedly 
incurred a debt that was transferred to HRRG for collection.  
HRRG then began leaving pre-recorded voicemail messages 
                                              
1 For convenience, we refer to the amended complaint 
simply as “the complaint.”  We construe the allegations of that 
pleading in the light most favorable to the Levinses.  See infra 
note 2. 
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on the Levinses’ phone in an attempt to collect the debt.  The 
following is a transcription of the message: 
ARS calling.  Please return our call at 1-800-694-
3048.  ARS is a debt collector.  This is an attempt 
to collect a debt.  Any information obtained will 
be used for that purpose.  Again, our number is 
1-800-694-3048.  Visit us at 
www.arspayment.com. 
 
(App. at 22 ¶ 31.) 
 
At the time the Levinses received that message over and 
over, they did not know the identity of the caller.  They had 
never received any written communication from HRRG.  
Having recently gone through bankruptcy, they knew of a debt 
collector with the full name “ARS National Services, Inc.” that 
was known as “ARS” for short.  That company, however, turns 
out to be wholly unrelated to HRRG.  While it has registered 
the name “ARS ACCOUNT RESOLUTION SERVICES” in 
New Jersey, HRRG has neither registered the stand-alone 
name “ARS” nor taken any other legal steps to do business 
under that specific name.     
 
There are numerous businesses that use the name 
“ARS,” including the debt collector the Levinses had heard of, 
which is a California corporation registered to transact 
business in New Jersey.  According to the Levinses, “by 
reputation the name ‘ARS’ is, without more, associated in the 
nation’s debt collection industry with ARS National Services 
Inc.”  (App. at 23 ¶ 41.)  A Google search of “ARS” along with 
“debt” or “collector” will result in links to many debt collectors 
other than HRRG.  Reference to www.arspayment.com, the 
website that HRRG mentioned in the pre-recorded messages it 
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left for the Levinses, does not narrow the field.  It only leads to 
a browser privacy warning that blocks access to the website.  
And, if one ignores the warning and accesses the site, the 
website begins tracking and storing information about the 
computer user.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Within a year of receiving the voicemail messages from 
HRRG, the Levinses filed their putative class-action complaint 
alleging that HRRG violated the FDCPA when attempting to 
collect debts from them and others similarly situated.  They 
eventually filed an amended complaint in which they claimed 
that the pre-recorded messages violate 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1692e(14), 1692d(6), and 1692e(10) because they “use the 
name of any business, company or organization other than the 
true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or 
organization”; “fail to provide meaningful disclosure of 
HRRG’s identity”; and “use false representations and 
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and to 
obtain information concerning a consumer[.]”  (App. at 19 
¶ 13.) 
 
HRRG moved to dismiss the case, invoking Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Along with its motion, 
HRRG filed an attorney declaration with supporting 
documents.  Among those was a certificate stating that it is 
registered to do business in New Jersey under the name “ARS 
ACCOUNT RESOLUTION SERVICES,” and a collection 
letter that it purports to have sent to Elaine Levins in November 
2015.  The Levinses opposed HRRG’s motion and submitted 
their own attorney declaration with documents listing hundreds 
of businesses registered in New Jersey under names that 
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include “ARS.”  After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the 
District Court granted the motion to dismiss.     
 
The Levinses have timely appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION2 
 
In appealing the order dismissing their complaint for 
failure to state a claim, the Levinses make three arguments.  
First, they say that HRRG violated § 1692e(14) because it did 
not use its true name in the voicemail messages.  Next, they 
argue that HRRG violated § 1692d(6) because the messages 
did not meaningfully disclose the caller’s identity.  And finally, 
they assert that HRRG violated § 1692e(10) because forcing 
consumers to call HRRG or navigate its website is a deceptive 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s dismissal 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), applying the 
same standard as the district court.”  Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 
139, 144 (3d Cir. 2012).  “We will affirm an order dismissing 
a complaint only when the complaint fails to contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 424 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d 
Cir. 2018).  We construe the allegations in the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving parties, the plaintiffs.  
Id. 
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means to collect debts and obtain information about a 
consumer.   
 
HRRG of course disputes all of those contentions.  It 
says that it did not violate § 1692e(14) because “ARS” is an 
abbreviation of its registered alternative business name “ARS 
Account Resolution Services,” which is a true name.  It then 
contends that it did not violate § 1692d(6) because the 
messages said that the caller was a debt collector, pointed out 
that the purpose of the call was to collect a debt, and provided 
a phone number and website for the consumer to use, all of 
which was a sufficient disclosure of identity.  And, last, it 
argues that it did not use deceptive collection practices in 
violation of § 1692e(10) because the messages informed 
consumers that any information obtained would be used to 
collect a debt.     
 
Before turning to the parties’ competing arguments, 
though, we must determine which materials can properly be 
considered in evaluating the District Court’s decision to 
dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 
 
A. We Decline To Rely On The Collection Letter 
Attached To HRRG’s Motion To Dismiss 
Because The Complaint Does Not Reference 
Or Rely On It.  
 
We “generally consider only the allegations contained 
in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint[,] and 
matters of public record” when evaluating whether dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1993).  But we can also consider “an undisputedly authentic 
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document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to 
dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.”  
Id.  We may do so because “the primary problem raised by 
looking to documents outside the complaint—lack of notice to 
the plaintiff—is dissipated where the plaintiff has actual 
notice ... and has relied upon [those] documents in framing the 
complaint.”  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 
2014) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation 
omitted).   
 
Here, HRRG asks us to consider the collection letter that 
it claims to have mailed to the Levinses in November 2015.  
The letter bears a company logo consisting of the letters 
“ARS,” says in the letterhead that “Account Resolution 
Services” is “a division of HRRG, LLC,” and, in the body of 
the letter, uses “ARS” as an abbreviated name.  (App. at 38.)  
HRRG urges us to conclude that the Levinses received that 
collection letter before the phone messages and so would have 
understood ARS and HRRG to be one and the same.  The 
Levinses respond that the letter is off limits at this stage of the 
litigation, and they are right.  We will not consider it because 
the claims in the Levinses’ complaint are not based on it.  
Rather, the claims are based on the pre-recorded phone 
messages that the Levinses allegedly received.  Indeed, the 
Levinses specifically allege that they have never received any 
written communication from HRRG, and we must take that as 
true, see Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (construing allegations in the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party).3 
                                              
3 The District Court’s decision likewise did not 
reference that collection letter.  We will, however, consider the 
certificate stating that HRRG is registered to do business in 
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Of course, our decision not to consider the letter at this 
stage does not mean that it is irrelevant or forever precluded 
from consideration.  Assuming it is properly tendered to the 
District Court, HRRG may rely on it later in a motion for 
summary judgment or at trial. 
 
With that decided, we can now consider whether the 
Levinses have stated their FDCPA claims with sufficient 
plausibility to withstand the motion to dismiss. 
 
B. The Levinses Have Stated A Plausible Claim 
Under § 1692e(14). 
 
Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive 
debt collection practices by debt collectors[.]”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692.  Because it is a remedial statute, “we construe its 
language broadly, so as to effect its purpose.”  Tatis, 882 F.3d 
at 427 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In 
evaluating whether a particular debt-collection practice 
violates the Act, “we employ a ‘least sophisticated debtor’ 
standard[.]”  Id. (citation omitted).  “The standard is objective, 
meaning that the specific plaintiff need not prove that she was 
actually confused or misled, only that the objective least 
sophisticated debtor would be.”  Id. (internal quotation marks, 
emphasis, and citation omitted).  “[That] standard aims to 
                                              
New Jersey under the name “ARS ACCOUNT RESOLUTION 
SERVICES,” (App. at 35), because it is a matter of public 
record, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196.  The 
District Court referenced the certificate in its decision, and 
neither party disputes that choice on appeal.  That is the limit 
of what we are considering outside of the complaint. 
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protect the gullible as well as the shrewd, but it nevertheless 
preserves a quotient of reasonableness[.]”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 
 
To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must 
allege that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt 
collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an 
attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the 
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting 
to collect the debt.”  Id.  Here, the parties only dispute the 
fourth element, i.e., whether the messages violated 
§§ 1692e(14), 1692d(6), or 1692e(10) of the Act.   
 
We conclude that the Levinses have stated a plausible 
claim under § 1692e(14) because, as alleged in the complaint, 
“ARS” is neither HRRG’s full business name, the name under 
which it usually transacts business, nor a commonly used 
acronym of its registered name “ARS ACCOUNT 
RESOLUTION SERVICES.”  Section 1692e prohibits a debt 
collector from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of 
any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  It contains a non-exhaustive 
list of prohibited conduct, one sort of which is “[t]he use of any 
business, company, or organization name other than the true 
name of the debt collector’s business, company, or 
organization.”  Id. § 1692e(14). 
 
The FDCPA is enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), which has offered guidance on how to 
interpret that statute.  Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 
F.3d 1367, 1372 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998).  Although the FTC’s 
guidance “does not have the force of law and is not entitled to 
deference in FDCPA cases[,]” we may adopt its interpretation 
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when we find its logic persuasive.  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 
464 F.3d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citation omitted).  The FTC has interpreted the 
“true name” requirement in § 1692e(14) to permit a debt 
collector to “use its full business name, the name under which 
it usually transacts business, or a commonly-used acronym[,]” 
as long as “it consistently uses the same name when dealing 
with a particular consumer.”  Statements of General Policy or 
Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097, 50107 (Dec. 13, 1988) 
[hereinafter FTC Commentary].  That is a sound interpretation 
of the statutory requirement, and we adopt it as our own. 
 
Here, at this early stage in the case, when we must take 
the allegations in the complaint as true, the Levinses have 
plausibly alleged facts suggesting that “ARS” is not the “true 
name” of HRRG.  While they do not deny that “ARS” is a name 
HRRG may use, they say that the acronym is commonly 
associated with other debt collection companies, including 
“ARS National Services, Inc.,” and that it could refer to 
hundreds of other businesses registered to do business in New 
Jersey under names that include “ARS.”  (App. at 23 ¶¶ 37, 41; 
App. at 41.)  See also Sayles v. Advanced Recovery Sys., Inc., 
865 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2017) (abbreviating defendant 
“Advanced Recovery Systems, Inc.” as “ARS”); Koby v. ARS 
Nat’l Servs., Inc., 846 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(abbreviating defendant “ARS National Services, Inc.” as 
“ARS”).  Nothing in the information properly before us 
indicates that “ARS” is HRRG’s full business name, the name 
under which it usually transacts business, or its commonly used 
acronym.  To the extent HRRG argues to the contrary, it is 
doing so without proper record support.  It will have an 
opportunity later to expand the record, but for now taking the 
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allegations in the complaint as true, we conclude that the 
Levinses have stated a plausible claim for relief under 
§ 1692e(14).4 
 
C. The Levinses Have Not Stated A Plausible 
 Claim Under § 1692d(6). 
 
Section 1692d prohibits a debt collector from 
“engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which 
                                              
4 The District Court reached the opposite conclusion by 
relying on Pescatrice v. Elite Recovery Service, Inc., No. 06-
61130, 2007 WL 1192441 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2007), and 
Strand v. Diversified Collection Service, Inc., 380 F.3d 316 
(8th Cir. 2004).  Those cases, however, are distinguishable.   
In Pescatrice, the court held that there was no violation 
of § 1692e(10) when a debt collector used an abbreviation of 
its company name in the return address of a mailing.  2007 WL 
1192441, at *4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) (prohibiting 
“[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to 
collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information 
concerning a consumer”); infra Section II.D.  Similarly, in 
Strand, the court held that a collection agency’s practice of 
using its initials and corporate logo on an envelope’s exterior 
did not violate § 1692f(8).  380 F.3d at 319; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692f(8) (prohibiting “[u]sing any language or symbol, other 
than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when 
communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by 
telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business 
name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt 
collection business”).  Both of those cases were based on 
different provisions of the FDCPA, and we do not interpret 
them as deciding the “true name” question that is at issue here. 
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is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with 
the collection of a debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692d.  It too, like 
§ 1692e, contains a non-exhaustive list of prohibited conduct, 
one type of which is “the placement of telephone calls without 
meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.”  Id. § 1692d(6).  
Here, though the issue is close, we conclude that the District 
Court was correct to rule that the Levinses have not stated a 
claim under § 1692d(6).  The voicemail messages provided 
enough information about the caller’s identity for the least 
sophisticated debtor to know that the call was from a debt 
collector and was an attempt to collect a debt.   
 
The statute does not define “meaningful disclosure[,]” 
but in Hart v. Credit Control, LLC, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit interpreted “meaningful 
disclosure” as requiring a debt collector’s voice message to 
provide two types of information:  first, “the name of the debt 
collection company[,]” and second, “the nature of the debt 
collection company’s business, which can be satisfied by 
disclosing that the call is on behalf of a debt collection 
company[.]”  871 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2017).  The court 
held that there was no violation of § 1692d(6) when the 
individual calling on behalf of the debt collector did not leave 
his or her personal name in a message because that individual 
provided a company name and stated that the call was from a 
debt collector.  Id. at 1259-60; see also id. at 1256 (“This is 
Credit Control calling with a message.  This call is from a debt 
collector.  Please call us at 866–784–1160.  Thank you.”).  
District courts in our Circuit have similarly interpreted 
“meaningful disclosure” as requiring a debt collector “to reveal 
itself as a collection agency when leaving messages” because 
“[m]eaningful disclosure requires a debt collector to disclose 
enough information so as not to mislead the recipient as to the 
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purpose of the call.”  See Pisarz v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 
16-4552, 2017 WL 1102636, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2017) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. 
(citing district court cases). 
 
The Levinses claim that saying “ARS” was not enough 
meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity to be lawful under 
§ 1692d(6).  As with their claim under § 1692e(14), they again 
argue that, from the words of the messages, it is not clear that 
“ARS” would uniquely refer to HRRG because there are other 
companies in the debt collection industry that are associated 
with the name “ARS,” and there are other businesses registered 
in New Jersey with business names or associated names that 
include “ARS.”  Although we agreed with that contention with 
respect to § 1692e(14)’s “true name” requirement, it has less 
force in the context of § 1692d(6) for two reasons. 
 
First, although it is possible for a debt collector’s phone 
message to violate both §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(14),5 a 
                                              
5 The FTC regards a debt collector’s use of “a false 
business name in a phone call” as violating both §§ 1692e(14) 
and 1692d(6).  See FTC Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. at 50105 
(“A debt collector who uses a false business name in a phone 
call to conceal his identity violates [§ 1692e(14)], as well as 
[§ 1692d(6)].”); id. at 50107 (“When a debt collector uses a 
false business name in a phone call, he violates [§ 1692d(6)] as 
well as [§ 1692e(14)].”).  We agree that such conduct would 
violate both §§ 1692e(14) and 1692d(6), but here the Levinses 
have not alleged that “ARS” is a “false business name” of 
HRRG.  They have only alleged and argued that the name 
“ARS” could refer to any number of companies that use the 
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violation of one provision is not necessarily a violation of the 
other because “meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity” 
is not restricted to providing the name of the debt collector.  As 
explained above, “meaningful disclosure of the caller’s 
identity” has been interpreted to include information that 
discloses the call is from a debt collector so as not to mislead 
the least sophisticated debtor of the purpose of the call.  Here, 
the voicemail messages would not mislead the least 
sophisticated debtor because the messages gave some 
identifying information about the caller, stated that the call was 
from a debt collector, and stated that the call was an attempt to 
collect a debt.  Even though the Levinses have sufficiently 
alleged that “ARS” is, as already discussed,  less than a “true 
name” as defined by § 1692e(14), they have not plausibly 
alleged that using the abbreviation “ARS,” which is associated 
with a registered identity of HRRG, amounts to a lack of 
meaningful disclosure of the sort forbidden by § 1692d(6).  
Nothing in the messages rises to the level of “harass[ment], 
oppress[ion], or abuse ... in connection with the collection of a 
debt,” which is the target of § 1692d. 
 
Second, and closely related, if we were to say that use 
of anything less than a debt collector’s “true name” was a 
violation of § 1692d(6), we would make § 1692d(6) 
superfluous in light of § 1692e(14).  See Everage v. Nat’l 
Recovery Agency, No. 14-2463, 2015 WL 1071757, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 11, 2015) (declining to import § 1692e(14)’s “true 
name” requirement into § 1692d(6)).  When Congress enacted 
the FDCPA, it used the term “true name” in § 1692e(14), 
whereas it used “meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity” 
                                              
name “ARS,” which falls short of saying that “ARS” is a “false 
business name” of HRRG. 
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in § 1692d(6).  Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 
95-109, 91 Stat. 874, 877-78 (1977).  The difference must have 
significance.  If Congress had wanted § 1692d(6) also to 
require that a debt collection company use its “true name[,]” 
then it would have so specified.  See Loughrin v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) (noting “when Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another[,] ... th[e Supreme] Court presumes that Congress 
intended a difference in meaning” (internal quotation marks, 
citation, and alteration omitted)).  We will not rewrite the 
statute and import the “true name” requirement of § 1692e(14) 
into § 1692d(6).   
 
For those reasons, the District Court properly dismissed 
the Levinses’ claim under § 1692d(6). 
 
D. The Levinses Have Not Stated A Plausible 
 Claim Under § 1692e(10). 
 
Finally, we also agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that the Levinses failed to state a claim under 
§ 1692e(10) because the messages adequately warned that any 
information obtained would be used to collect a debt.  
Section 1692e(10) prohibits “[t]he use of any false 
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to 
collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a 
consumer.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 
 
Violations of § 1692e(10) usually “include 
impersonating a public official, falsely representing that 
unpaid debts will be referred to an attorney, and 
misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed.”  Harvey v. 
Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 2006) 
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(internal citations omitted); see also, e.g., Crossley v. 
Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding attorney 
violated § 1692e(10) when he sent a collection letter that 
falsely represented that a mortgage foreclosure case was 
already in litigation, that threatened to take action within one 
week, and that failed to inform debtor of her right to cure).  To 
state a claim under § 1692e, a false statement “must be material 
when viewed through the least sophisticated debtor’s eyes[,]” 
which means “it has the potential to affect the decision-making 
process of the least sophisticated debtor[.]”  Jensen v. Pressler 
& Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 
Here, nothing in the messages rises to the level of being 
materially deceptive, misleading, or false.  The plain language 
of each message reveals that the caller is a debt collector, that 
the call is part of an attempt to collect a debt, and that any 
information  obtained will be used in that attempt.  Given those 
clear disclosures, even the least sophisticated debtor is fairly 
on notice that calling the phone number provided in the 
message or visiting the website might result in the debt 
collector obtaining information that it could use in trying to 
collect the debt.  The caller’s purpose is transparent and the 
messages are far removed from the false representations that 
typically have been held to violate § 1692e(10).  The District 
Court thus properly dismissed the claim brought under that 
FDCPA subsection. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal of the § 1692e(14) claim and remand for 
further proceedings.  We will affirm, however, the District 
18 
Court’s dismissal of the claims under §§ 1692d(6) and 
1692e(10). 
